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Abstract.  The World Trade Organization (WTO) is among those institutions that advocate free trade in goods, service and capital 
among nations.  This view is not shared universally, however, especially when there are important natural resource, environmental and 
labor issues at stake.  In fact, some countries discourage the exportation of natural resource goods, while others encourage such trade.  
This paper examines possible explanations for these differences, focusing on the roles of (a) the "taste" for the resource goods in the 
domestic economy and (b) diminishing returns to labor in the non-resource sectors. 
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Introduction 
 
Why are some countries with important natural resource 
sectors reluctant to engage in international trade while others 
embrace the opportunity with enthusiasm?  Does the answer 
lie in different attitudes toward protecting domestic industries 
from foreign competition?  Does reluctance to trade reflect the 
belief that exports of resource goods will lead to degradation 
of the natural resource sectors, especially where such sectors 
are not managed?  The success of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and other trade agreements may rest, in 
part, on finding the answers to these questions.  This paper is 
a modest contribution to the discussion. 
 
In fact, there is a growing literature on the consequences of 
trade for a country with an important renewable resource 
sector.  McRae (1978) is among those who have explored 
trade issues for an economy whose resource sector is 
characterized by open access externalities.   Segerson (1988) 
presents an excellent summary of the pre-1986 literature on 
this topic.  More recently,  Chichilnisky (1994) has argued 
that, under open access conditions a country may mistakenly 
behave as if it had a comparative advantage in producing 
resource goods, exacerbating the problem of the production 
externality.  Important insights have been generated by 
Brander and Tayler (1997a, 1997b, 1998), who have 
considered the impacts of trade between two countries, each of 
which has a resource sector that is characterized by $open 
access# conditions.  These analysts argue that the resource-
exporting country experiences real income losses while the 
importer gains.  When even one of the countries adopts a 
resource management strategy, it is possible that both will 
gain from trade.  Emami and Johnston (2000), using the 
Brander-Taylor framework, have shown that there are 
circumstances where, when two countries are trading, 
resource management by the importing partner may lead to 
losses for both countries.  This possibility emerges when 
resource management leads to higher prices of the resource 
good such that the (negative) terms of trade effects outweigh 
the gains from resource management.  The importer loses and, 
as in the Brander-Taylor model, so does the exporter. 
 
Recently, Hannesson (2000) has demonstrated persuasively 
that exporters of natural resource goods need not experience 
losses from higher export prices, even under open access 
conditions.  He points out that such losses depend on $the 
assumption that there are constant returns in the production of 
other commodities (p. 123).#   Through using an alternative, 
$specific diminishing-returns production function (ibid),# 
Hannesson is able to demonstrate that a country which 
expands exports of the resource good in response to a higher 
price may experience a welfare gain.   
 
In this paper we look behind this intriguing argument.  In 
particular, we explore possible reasons for why trade may 
benefit some countries but not others and we investigate the 
possibility that one explanation lies in the extent of the 
diminishing returns to labor in the non-resource sectors.  Our 
analysis preserves the prevailing model in the literature, 
including the assumed production and consumption 
relationships, as well as the assumption of steady-state 
conditions.  The paper reports on our findings to date in the 
form of hypotheses for further examination at both conceptual IIFET 2000 Proceedings   
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and empirical levels.  Our work suggests that a country s 
willingness to permit exports of natural resource goods may 
be negatively related to (1) the wage-rate elasticity of demand 
for labor in its non-resource sectors and (2) the relative $taste# 
for the resource good in the domestic market.  Additional 
exploration of the underlying relationships may increase 
understanding of why some countries are reluctant to import 
manufacturing and agricultural goods in exchange for natural 
resource goods, while other countries encourage such trade.  
We extend the analyses discussed above, focusing on the roles 
played by relative demands for the resource good and the 
nature of the production relationship in the rest of the 
economy, i.e., the non-resource good sectors. 
 
 
The model 
 
Following Hannesson, we focus on a single country, 
characterized by goods produced in two competitive sectors: 
H, a renewable, natural resource sector and M, the rest of the 
economy.  The framework is general equilibrium, with M 
serving as the numeraire.   The country is a price-taker in 
world markets and our interest is in the welfare effects of 
moving from autarky to free trade in response to higher world 
prices of the resource good. Will the losses that accompany a 
shifting of factors of production into the $inefficient,# open-
access, natural resource sector be offset by the real income 
gains from favorable terms of trade and on what factors do the 
net gains or losses depend?  Our renewable resource is a 
fishery. 
 
We retain the simple, two input, two good, steady-state 
production model of the current literature, as follows: 
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where  A is a positive constant sometimes known as the 
$catchability coefficient,# r is the $intrinsic growth rate# of the 
stock of the resource and is what makes it $renewable,# K is 
the $carrying capacity# of the fishery,  L is the total labor 
supply in the economy, while LH and LM are the amounts of 
labor used in the production (harvesting) of H and M, 
respectively.  The exponent, P, stands for $production,# while 
the exponent, ￿ , is a measure of the productivity of labor in 
the production of M (actually, it is the production elasticity of 
labor in M).   In the Brander-Taylor framework,  ￿   1 while, 
for Hannesson, ￿   0.5.  Because of our interest in the role 
played by this coefficient we simply specify that   0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1, 
thereby ruling out increasing marginal returns to labor. Note 
that, while unspecified in this abbreviated version of the 
model, there is a second factor of production in the H sector: 
the stock of the natural resource good. Under open access 
conditions, it is generally assumed that economic returns to 
this stock - a rent - are driven to zero because of the absence 
of an owner to collect these returns.  This results from 
equating the wage rate, W, to the value of the average product 
of labor in H and to the marginal product of labor in M: 
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where PH is the price of the resource good and PM , the price 
of the output of the non-resource sector, is unity.   
 
On the demand side we retain the Brander-Taylor 
specification of the aggregate utility (welfare) function: 
 
(6)  ) M ( ) H (   =   U C B) - (1 C B  
 
where the $C # exponent donates units consumed and B, a 
$taste# indicator, is a second variable of interest in determining 
whether there are net gains from trade. 
 
Clearly, any $results# that come from analysis of this model 
may be peculiar to the specification of the model itself.  The 
purpose of the exercise, then, as stated earlier, is to generate 
possible insights into what may motivate countries  decisions 
on trade in natural resources and, perhaps, suggest both 
testable hypotheses and directions for future conceptual work. 
 
 
Trade and Welfare
1 
 
The indirect utility function for the above model is 
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where  ) B - (1 B =
B) - (1 B )  
 
By differentiating U* with respect to the PH  we can 
investigate the determinants of whether a higher price of PH, 
obtainable by shifting from autarky to trade - one that 
increases the incentive to expand production of (and to export) 
H - raises, reduces or has no effect on the country s economic 
well-being.   
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Thus, 
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Equation (8) shows that the response of the optimal utility 
level to a change in the price of the resource good is the sum 
of (a) the response of optimal utility to a change in relative 
prices, holding income constant, resulting from an adjustment 
in the consumption mix and (b) the response of optimal utility 
to the new income level resulting from the price change (a 
change in relative prices affects the product mix and, thus, the 
income generated from production.).  This new income level 
would, by itself - i.e., without considering the direct impact of 
a price change on consumption - change the consumption mix 
and, hence, utility. 
 
Note that (b) is the product of (i) the rate at which U* changes 
with income, holding prices constant (i.e., the marginal utility 
of income) and (ii) the change in income that results from the 
price change.  This latter quantity can be further decomposed 
into changes in labor and non-labor income (see appendix). 
 
So that:  
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The first term is positive.  With an increase in the price of the 
resource good, wage rates rise and more labor is drawn into 
the resource sector.  Note that this is the case even if the 
production of H declines with an increase in its price.  With 
more labor in the H sector, total payments to labor in that 
sector must rise. (This would be true even if there were no 
change in the wage rate; i.e., even if ￿ ￿￿￿  The sign on the 
second term is negative because, since 0￿￿￿ 1 the demand for 
labor in the M sector is wage-rate-elastic
2.   Payments to labor 
in the non-resource sector will fall because the increase in the 
wage rate is less, on a percentage basis, than the decrease in 
labor employed in that sector.  Finally, the last term is negative 
as well.  With fewer units of M being produced and no change 
in its selling price, PM, rental payments to the $fixed# factor in 
that sector must decline.  As demonstrated in the appendix, 
however, the resource price and the total income level move 
together.  In particular, the country s income is higher at 
higher prices of the resource good
3. 
 
The situation can be depicted graphically.   In Figure 1b, L 
represents the total labor in the economy and the VMPLM 
curve is a graphical representation of equation (5)
4.  The 
horizontal difference between these two relationships is drawn 
as  SLH  in Figure 1a and shows, for each wage rate, the 
quantity of labor available for the production of H.  The 
VAPLH curve depicts equation (4), so that equilibrium in the 
labor market occurs at W*, with L*H used to produce H and 
L*M used in the production of M.  
 
In equilibrium, the total payment to labor is given by the 
rectangle  OW 
*TL in Figure 1b, while rental earnings in the M 
sector are given by the area under VMPLM and above W
*R.  
No rent is earned in the H sector. 
 
An increase in PH is reflected in an upward shift of VAPLH, to 
VAP LH,  as shown in Figure 1a.  The wage rate rises to W  and 
payments to labor increase to OW 
 T 
 L, while rental earnings 
in the M sector decline by the amount W
*W
 R
 R.  The net gain 
in total factor payments is R R 
  T 
  T. 
 
This higher income, all of which we assume accrues equally to 
the members of the population included in L, allows 
consumption of both H and M to rise and, as suggested by 
equation (8) leads to a higher utility level.  Note that this is the 
case even though labor shifts from the M to the H sector
5. 
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Figure 1: An Increase in PH: Effects on Factor Payments 
However, the increase in PH has a more direct effect on U 
which, as indicated by equation (8) is negative
6.   At issue is 
whether the utility gain from higher net factor payments is 
high enough to offset the utility loss from higher prices of the 
resource good. To address this, we are attempting to 
determine, analytically, the relationships between parameter 
values and gains from trade, if any.  
 
Meanwhile, we report simulation results (Table 1) that may 
suggest possible relationships.  Note, however, that our 
chosen parameter values preclude the use of labor beyond 
maximum sustainable yield levels in the production of H, a 
condition that significantly restricts our ability to generalize 
our findings. 
 
Table 1 reports, for selected J and E combinations, both 
autarky prices and the lowest prices of H, () P , for which the 
country experiences gains from exporting H without 
specializing in the production of H.  In the table, autarky 
prices are higher at higher values of J and/or E.  This is also 
the case for the () P  prices.  Thus, for the selected values and 
ranges of the model parameters, it appears that the greater this 
country’s “taste” for H (as reflected in higher E values) and\or 
the closer to “constant returns to labor” in the M sector (the 
higher J), the higher must be the price of H in international 
markets for this country to gain from exporting H.   
Furthermore, export prices must be substantially above 
autarky prices to induce trade, at least in some cases. 
 
Another way of saying this is that countries with relatively low 
J and E values are likely to participate in international trade as 
exporters of the resource good over a wider range of prices 
than are those with higher values of those parameters.   
Assuming these findings hold up analytically, we offer 
possible explanations for the implied relationships.  For given 
values, nominal income falls as J decreases.  Under the 
conditions we specify, which preclude a “positively-sloped” 
segment of the production possibilities frontier, lower J values 
lead to a reduced set of production possibilities, lower income 
levels and, hence, except at extremely low J values (not shown 
here), lower autarky prices.  Similarly, for given J values (i.e., 
given production possibility frontiers), “steeper” indifference 
curves (along a given ray from the origin, reflecting lower E 
values) intersect the frontier at lower H values in autarky, 
which, given the negative slope and concavity of the 
production possibilities frontier, means lower autarky prices of 
H.  This, in turn, reduces the international price levels 
necessary to induce trade. 
 
J  0.7 0.3  0.05 
B  Autarky  () P   Autarky  () P  
 
Autarky  () P  
 
0.9  1.94  3.63 .89 1.26 .72  .77 
0.5  .96  1.65  .20 .29 .09 .10 
0.1  .64 .78 .07 .09 .01 .02 
(k=1000, L=50, r=.2, A=.0015 and   4
P
M M L
J   ) 
 
Table 1. Autarky and Minimum Trade Prices () P  for  
 Various  J, B Combinations 
 
Implications 
 
If these preliminary findings hold up under more detailed 
analysis, they suggest that countries with relatively less elastic IIFET 2000 Proceedings   
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demands for labor in their non-resource sectors may be more 
inclined to participate in international trade as exporters of 
their resource good.   In the case of the production function 
used in this example, this means that, all else equal, the lower 
the production elasticity of the non-resource sector with 
respect to labor usage in that sector, J, the greater the gains (or 
the smaller the losses) from increased world prices of the 
resource good. There are many possible explanations for 
difference in the ￿ values across countries.  One explanation 
could be that labor is simply more productive in some 
countries than in others, possibly due to differences in human 
capital (through education, for example), the quality of the 
$fixed# factor, such as land, or the level of technological 
progress.  Another explanation is that even countries with 
identical natural resource sectors may differ in what is 
produced in their non-resource sectors: some may have 
extensive agricultural sectors while others emphasize 
manufacturing.  In any event, it seems clear that efforts to 
understand the willingness of countries with important natural 
resource sectors to participate in international trade must 
examine conditions in both the resource and non-resource 
sectors. 
 
Our findings also suggest that those countries for which the 
taste for the resource good is low, relative to that for goods 
from the non-resource sectors, may be trade-oriented over a 
broader range of world-wide prices.  Here, again, the 
comparison is with goods produced in the non-resource 
sectors which may, of course, differ across countries. 
 
Before collecting data to test these arguments empirically, we 
intend to develop the analytical framework more fully.   
Meanwhile, we hope the work to date will spark interest 
within the WTO and the research community in looking at the 
role of conditions in the non-resource sectors of various 
economies and in the domestic demands for resource and non-
resource goods to help understand why some countries choose 
to participate in international trade while others do not. 
 
In this paper we have focused on the case where the natural 
resource sector is characterized by open access conditions.  In 
fact a similar story can be told for the case where that sector is 
managed, a topic left for a future paper. 
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Appendix 
 
From (4),   W =
L
H P
H
P
H   or,  WL = H P H
P
H  
From (5),  W =
L
M
M
P J
  or, 
J
WL = M
M P  
Thus, 
WL
- 1
+ ) L + L W( = WL + WL = M + H P M M H
M
H
P P
H ‚ ‚
„
•
¤ ¤
'
§
J
J
J
 
That is, total income can be broken into payments to labor, 
) L + L W( M H , plus payments to the 
 (implicit) non-labor input used to produce M,  WL
- 1
M ‚ ‚
„
•
¤ ¤
'
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J
J
.   
 
From this,  
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which is equation (9) in the text.  Note that we also can write: 
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From (5),  W = L
1 -
M
J J , and we know that 
dP
dL - =
dP
dL
H
H
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thus, 
 
0.   >  
dP
dW
L   =
dP
dL W -
dP
dW
L +
dP
dL W
dP
) M + H P d(
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
P P
H {
 
 
                                                             
Endnotes 
 
1.As used here, $welfare# refers to the well-being of 
this country, as measured by U.  It is not intended to 
have normative implications but, rather, to aid in our 
understanding of what underlies trade policy 
differences among countries with important natural 
resource sectors. 
2.From equation (5), note that this elasticity is [1/￿￿-
1)] 
3.In this analysis, $income# refers to nominal, not 
real, income.  We use changes in the utility measure 
as an indicator of real income changes. 
4.The relationships are depicted as straight lines for 
convenience, only. 
5.Such a result does not occur where ￿ 1 (the 
Brander and Taylor case) because the wage rate does 
not respond to changes in PH.   
6.This is the only effect on utility in the case where 
￿ 1. 
 